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The Dynamics and Dilemmas of the Niger Delta: A Discourse on Insecurity and Demographic Transition

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Abstract
Until recently, the Niger Delta was distinctive for empowering and transforming lives. The relative advantage of its cities blurred the inherent multidimensional consequences of oil exploration on the environment. Over time, the effects of oil spills on the inhabitants were massive. The people's agony was exacerbated by perceived governmental neglect which accounted for the amplification of frustration and aggression among a large majority of the poor that constitute more than three-quarters of the population. As a result, different categories of individuals became activists committed to peaceful protests. However, with a plethora of insensitive and irresponsible governments, the legitimate means soon evolved into militancy, political thuggery and assassinations. Consequently, Niger Delta communities became synonymous with insecurity, pseudo-governance and youth restiveness. This article examined the trends and dimensions of the unholy dynamics that drove demographic transition in the region by highlighting the connections between the dilemma of a failed state and underdevelopment.

Keywords: militancy, political thuggery, kidnapping, pseudo-governance, state failure

Background and Problem Statement
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria is an epitome of contradictions. Although the area is characterized by oil deposits that have made the country one of the leading oil producing nations, it is among the poorest areas not only in Nigeria but also the world (Ojakorotu & Olawale, 2009; Ikporukpo, 2002). Studies on the Niger Delta have identified some interlinking factors such as political marginalization, economic strangulation and environmental degradation with conflicts and recurring restiveness (Dan-jumbo, 2006; Banigo, 2005; Ikporukpo, 2002; Gbadegesin, 2001; Durotoye, 2000; Osuntokun, 2000; Petters, 2000; Ibeanu, 1999; Onosode, 2000; Onishi, 1999; Civil Liberties Organization, 1996; Okoosi, 1995).

For the most part, a large majority of the people did not perceive the magnitude of their exploitation mainly due to lack of exposure to the information necessary for an objective assessment of the social, economic and environmental reality (Nwokocha, 2006). Consequently, only a few elite activists challenged the people's subjugation with little or no success. Events indicate that the situation in the Niger Delta is such that the people's condition
continues to deteriorate, leaving violence almost as the only viable option for overcoming perceived society-inflicted inadequacies (Banigo, 2005). The people’s agony is exacerbated by continued governmental neglect which has accounted for the amplification of frustration and aggression among a large majority of the poor (Afinotan & Ojakorotu, 2009), who incidentally, constitute more than three-quarters of the entire population of the area (Dan-Jumbo, 2006). With the realization of the delusiveness inherent in projects such as the Oil and Mineral Producing and Development Commission (OMPADEC), and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) among others (Abraham, 2009), Niger Delta cities have become theatres of restiveness and insecurity that manifest in different ways with kidnapping as the most recent in the literature.

This study argues that justifiable as the course of challenging injustice may be, innovations embedded in militancy, political thuggery and kidnapping are in themselves illegitimate and can hardly contribute to meaningful development. These would rather, in the long run, deplete the human capital of relevant communities whose members would as a result be reoriented to thrive in violence rather than intellectual progression that may draw its peoples out of poverty and powerlessness. In what follows, we examine the phases of these protests by emphasizing how the contradictions of each stage gave impetus to the evolution of another.

From Environmental Activism to Human Kidnapping: The processes
This section examines the processes through which activities of a few individuals for community well-being over time degenerated into a struggle for uncontrolled personal survival strategies exemplified by thuggery and kidnapping. These were perhaps ways of expressing frustrations arising from perceived ignoble success recorded through organized media and community protests and persistent poverty among the people. As was observed:

...ever since Shell struck oil and drilled its first well in Ogoniland in the 60s Ogoni lands, forests, rivers, creeks and lakes have continued to be degraded and polluted from massive spills and leaks. Gas flaring has totally banished the night and acid rains have corroded buildings and metals. In many instances in Ogoniland, and other areas, Shell flares gas horizontally, directly on to the shoulders of the community, causing a rise in temperature, discomfort, dehydration and posing serious health hazards... the people now live in disease and squalor, in huts and dilapidated buildings. Many suffer from malnutrition and disease of the lungs, heart attacks, skin disease, dysentery, typhoid fever, asthma, etc. the roads are bad, and scarcely motorable... the Ogoni people have virtually nothing to show for the vast revenue Nigeria gets from the oil on their
...land... With so much wealth raked in by shell and government from Ogoniland and with increasing sufferings of the people, survival instincts and threats of annihilation evolved a vision to struggle for survival (Civil Liberties Organization, 1996: xiii).

The above situation is common among communities in the Niger Delta. This catalogue of inadequacies resulted in organized critical protests initially championed by environmental activists that adopted non-violent means such as rallies and petitions to seek justice. This stage of the protest was characterized by the activities of a few individuals in a region with high level of illiteracy. With time the legitimate mechanisms for seeking redress caved-in; starting from the early 1990s government insensitivity and sustained under-development of the region became widespread (Banigo, 2005). For instance, experience shows that the allocation of resources among component units in Nigeria runs against the principle of equity and fair play even though the authorities strive to hoodwink individuals and groups through justifications that find expression in propaganda (Dan-Jumbo, 2006). As Akinyemi (2001: 9) observed:

It is an act of self-deception for anyone to argue that there is nothing wrong with the revenue allocation formula. We have had basically two systems of revenue allocation in Nigeria. The first system, which we practised during the First Republic, allowed the North to keep the proceeds from its groundnut and cotton, the West to keep the proceeds from its cocoa and East to keep the proceeds from its coal and oil palm produce. Then we changed the system so that the Federal Government got its hands on the proceeds from on-shore and off-shore crude petroleum, and yet we don’t expect the minorities in the oil producing areas to perceive that this is an injustice done to them.

Indeed, people in the area perceived the situation as a kind of internal colonisation leading to the formation of various groups and organizations whose immediate preoccupation was to enthrone justice and equity (Ikporukpo, 2000). As Table 1 shows, the percentage of revenue accruable to units and states based on the derivation principle has been on the decline from 100% in 1953 to 1.5% in 1984. Though the table appears obsolete, the derivation figure of 13 percent has not changed and remains the most recent (Omotoso, 2010). The slight increase in 1992 and 1999 to 3% and 13% respectively has not improved the situation of the Niger Delta people (Eraikhuemen, 2003) which has partly been blamed on corruption among political leaders in the area (Omotoso, 2010). The sudden drop in the allocation of funds to resource-producing communities between 1960 and 1982 questioned the readiness of Nigeria to embrace true federalism (Eraikhuemen, 2003).
Table 1: Revenue allocation based on the derivation principle at different periods in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of revenue accruing to units based on the principle of derivation</th>
<th>Percentage reduction of revenue against the 1953 figure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eraikhuemen, 2003

Unfortunately in some instances, leaders of groups that insisted on social equity were murdered extra-judicially. The case of Ken Saro-Wiwa, an environmentalist and human rights activist, is a classic example (Civil Liberties Organization, 1996). During his trial, Saro-Wiwa (1995: 43) stated among others that:

*Shell has waged an ecological war in Ogoni since 1958... an ecological war is highly lethal, the more so as it is unconventional. It is omicidal in its effect. Human life, flora, fauna, the air, fall at its feet, and finally, the land itself dies... generally, it is supported by all the traditional instruments ancillary to warfare – propaganda, money and deceit. Victory is assessed by profits, and in this sense, Shell’s victory in Ogoni has been total.*

Perhaps, to deter subsequent attempts by aggrieved persons or groups from voicing their marginalisation, Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues were killed. The implications of such barbaric acts included loss of faith in seeking redress through legitimate means and in the extreme, the reorientation of the people to design their own pathways to freedom without necessarily appraising inherent micro and macro consequences.

Militancy was adopted in the face of the obvious failure of legitimate activism as a strategy to challenge injustice. The latter mechanism combined elements of persuasive appeal with restiveness and raw force. As such, it not only differed in approach from the former but also in the composition of actors. For instance, a large majority of Niger Delta militants were young, illiterate and unemployed whose frustration became unbearable after an excursion to Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja in the wake of organized rallies to support the transformation of General Abacha (a maximum
military dictator) from military head of state to civilian president (Tamunonengi, 2008). Inevitably, these youths were confronted with the reality of Nigeria’s wealth which flows from their impoverished Niger Delta communities, and the contrasting affluence of the FCT and its environs which scarcely contributed to the economy of the country (Akinola, 2008). Amaechi (2009: 37) captured the situation when he stated:

...when they got to Abuja they saw some things that looked like Washington DC and these people have never travelled outside this country before so they felt they were in a different world; they wanted to make sure that this was the capital of Nigeria so they asked is this Nigeria? And got confirmation that it was Nigeria... so they said if they could build this kind of beautiful place why can’t they do it in the Niger Delta; they were told that arrangements were “in the pipeline”. So, the people felt that the money was in the pipeline and they began breaking oil pipelines. Up till today they’ve been looking for those plans that the federal government has for them in the pipeline.

They could immediately perceive their backwardness and strangulation. Karl Marx had argued that unless and until a class transforms from a ‘class in itself’ to a ‘class for itself’ exhibiting revolutionary tendencies is difficult to achieve (Ritzer, 2008; Haralambos & Holborn, 2004). Indeed, a large majority of peoples of the Niger Delta were embedded in false consciousness and hardly perceived the enormity of the underdevelopment of the area. That journey to the capital city and the consequent reorientation of a host of youths in the area not only altered their hitherto docile approach to seeking redress but also gave impetus to the institutionalization of violence which the Nigerian state has not been able to fully grapple with. Ikporukpo (2002: 30) chronologically highlighted some activities of militants in the Niger Delta as follows:

Blockades of oil production activities, some of which are violent, became particularly prominent in the 1990s... in 1994 and 1995, the occurrence was less than 100 annually. This increased to 150 in 1997 and as many as 325 in 1998; although there was a decline thereafter. Some of these were peaceful invasions while others involved the use of firearms. For instance, of the 176 incidents in 2000, 18 percent involved the use of firearms. Youths from virtually all parts of the oil-producing areas, have been involved in such incidents which affect not only SPDC, which is the largest company, but also all others.

This paper posits that militancy in the region was (and still is) characterized by the desire to sabotage Nigeria’s economy and, by extension, its development. The actions of militants led to multifaceted effects that impacted negatively on the operations of oil companies (including Shell, Chevron, Mobil, etc), the host communities and other groups.
remarkable about this stage is the selflessness exhibited by these militants, to the extent that accepting pecuniary gratification was perceived not only as a distortion of the goal of sabotaging the system but also an anathema that must be resisted (Peterside, 2009). In the long run though, these militants got closer to extreme poverty and were eventually engaged in other ignoble activities such as political thuggery and kidnapping. It has been noted that part of the reason why militancy waned, in the wake of the 2007 general elections was the engagement of these militants as political thugs (Tamunonengi, 2008).

Unlike activists and militants, political thugs did not have a well organized structure whereby some form of hierarchy and leadership existed. It was a loose activity that emphasized individualism and secrecy. For the most part, the activities of these thugs ran contrary to the collective goal of the region and, in fact, amounted to a dislocation of the essence of the movement. The contradiction of this stage of the transition is mainly in its characteristic internal disaffection wherein thugs from the Niger Delta were hired to act against individuals and groups from the same region (Tamunonengi, 2008). It became the case of enemies from within. Eventually, the motivation for the struggle against injustice was almost completely extinguished as a result of the competition between selflessness and greed. It needs to be pointed out that the activities of these thugs were largely periodic with the perpetrators receiving compelling rewards from their sponsors (Peterside, 2009).

Having been exposed to mega-money in earlier periods, these thugs became unstoppable even after elections. So disoriented, the quest for money became a constant concern which led to change in tactics among hitherto political thugs who could no longer wait for another four years of elections to perpetrate their heinous activities (Peterside, 2009). Consequently, the metamorphosis of these individuals and groups into kidnappers was swift. Initially perceived as a re-emergence of militancy, given that those kidnapped were mainly expatriate oil workers, it later became evident that their client-base (scope of victimization) was limitless. As such, anybody irrespective of age, sex, religion or ethnicity could be abducted insofar as the kidnappers were convinced that a “reasonable ransom” could be paid by the families and/or friends of their victim (Tamunonengi, 2008; Peterside, 2009). Thus, Niger Delta cities became enclaves of insecurity characterized by anomie and normlessness.

Events during the period showed that both government and religion lost their power of control. For instance, Port Harcourt was under siege for more than five months, between June and October 2007, as a result of the activities of militants and kidnappers. Initially, it was difficult to ascertain whether the seemingly re-emergent militant groups were genuinely committed to the cause of the Niger Delta. However, it became clear with time that the change in status from militancy to kidnapping was purely egoistic against the altruistic motive that guided their hitherto engagements. The antithesis of events of that
period was the exposure of all and sundry to the risk of death as the *anything goes* approach was employed in attaining the goal of kidnapping. The Rivers State government it was noted exhibited lack of capacity at quelling the insurgency (Tamunonengi, 2008). Although the city of Port Harcourt was brought under control by the Joint Task Force (JTF), these locations remained cities of insecurity for individuals and groups (Peterside, 2009).

As time progressed, kidnapping became almost a national issue with its occurrence reported in virtually all states in southern part of the country. It has been argued that even when such an act takes place outside the thematic region, the perpetrators have links with the Niger Delta area (Tamunonengi, 2008). Needless to say, such activity is unconnected with protesting the generally acknowledged injustice on the people of the Niger Delta but purely on individualistic grounds.

**Demographic Implications of Insecurity and Transition in the Niger Delta**

The Demographic Transition Theory (DTT) has been modified and adapted in examining the Niger Delta situation. Conventional transition theory focuses on the fertility-mortality interaction as it impacts population dynamics of society at different epochs in history (Isiugo-Abanihe, 1994; Jhingan, Bhatt & Desai, 2006). The theory in characterising the pre-modern era identified high fertility and mortality arising mainly from lack of awareness, rudimentary technology and traditional conservatism. The beginning of modernisation saw developmental improvements in communication, medicine, agriculture and machinery that led to significant reduction in mortality rate while fertility remained high, again due to the people’s faithfulness to pronatalism. The third among the trinity of these evolutionary stages, the modern era, characterised by low fertility and mortality resulted from awareness, adoption of family planning methods, high level of technology particularly in medicine, and massive involvement in paid jobs in the formal sector among others accounted for decrease in population.

Although severely criticised for de-emphasising migration and for being less relevant in explaining population change in the 21st century Africa, DTT serves as the threshold upon which some other perspectives thrived (Newman & Matzke, 1984; Kammeyer & Ginn, 1986). For instance, assuming that the theory places Nigeria at the second stage of the transition, it could generate the impetus for a deeper inquiry that may eventually throw-up other perspectives seeking understanding of the basis of such placement. To be sure, Caldwell’s theory of intergenerational wealth flows which explains African high fertility situation based on parents’ calculated benefits from a large family size and the corresponding upward wealth flows (Caldwell, 2005) finds expression when juxtaposed against DTT’s first and second stages in particular as they relate to high fertility.

Table 2 shows stages of demographic transition in the Niger Delta following innovation and rebellion against perceived marginalisation. We note that this table from which we also derived our Figure 1 is largely hypothetical,
the outcome of insights from secondary data (Abraham, 2009; Afinotan & Ojakorotu, 2009; Otite, 2009; Ojakorotu & Olawale, 2009; Nwagbo, 2009; Akinola, 2008; Eraikhuemen, 2003) and what we consider the likely natural response to environmental, physical and mental insecurity in the thematic area. As such, it may not be a perfect view of reality as primary data on population dynamics were not collected.

Table 2: Illustration of the demographic transition in the Niger Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Fertility</th>
<th>Mortality</th>
<th>In-migration</th>
<th>Out-migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Prior to innovation/ rebellion</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Class consciousness/ beginning of innovation/rebellion</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Post-restive Niger Delta</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nwokocha, 2013

Table 2 shows stages of Demographic transition in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. It is an improvement on the conventional DTT which ignored the migration aspect of population dynamics in explaining change in society. The table enables us to examine the population implications of the Niger Delta situation from issues related to three broad variables: fertility, mortality and migration. Prior to innovation and rebellion, fertility and in-migration to the region were high, while mortality and out-migration remained relatively low; residents of the communities were less interested in relocating to other areas. Otite (2009: 1) captures the situation of the region pre-restiveness:

_The Niger Delta reputed to be the third largest wetland in the world, which sustains a complex biodiversity, otherwise attractive to tourists, explorers-adventurers, traders, businessmen/businesswomen, academicians and a variety of researchers._

However, as the Niger Delta transited to uncertainty, rebellious insecurity and ungovernable state there was a corresponding reverse in the people's demography. For instance, Nwagbo (2009) had observed that the effects of the Niger Delta crises included loss of lives, injuries, revenues and facilities especially pipelines, which have also exacerbated environmental hazards and deterioration of public health (Long, 2007). Figure 1, is a diagrammatic representation of the demographic transition in the Niger Delta including migration.

At the macro-variable level, insecurity has implications for fertility, mortality and migration. In the Niger Delta, for instance, the high incidence of militancy, thuggery and kidnapping and the attendant insecurity could have
discouraged both endogamous and exogamous marriages. In the latter sense, people from other cultures and locations would likely perceive the norms and values of the Niger Delta as those that thrive in restiveness, anxiety and insecurity which individuals from the area are likely to exhibit within marriage. Although such a perception may be erroneous and misleading, it may however impinge on marital status among the peoples, made manifest through prolonged age at marriage in relevant communities. Delay in reproductive behaviour is usually associated with late marriage which in turn affects the occurrence of pregnancy and outcomes (Nwokocha, 2007).

![Figure 1: Graph showing Demographic Transition in the Niger Delta](source)

Key: ft = fertility; mt = mortality; in-mg = in-migration; ou-mg = out-migration

Research shows that the risk of pregnancy is higher at extreme ages. Arkutu (1995) had specifically noted that adolescents under 17 years and women who are older (aged over 35 and particularly over 40) are more likely to have complications during pregnancy. Beyond the fact that it is biologically challenging for older women to undergo pregnancy, some get involved in repeated child-bearing at very short intervals to make up for perceived lost time. The cumulative effects of the above scenario are a reverse-transition from high to lowering fertility and a high maternal mortality rate. Nwokocha (2006) and Arkutu (1995) observed that maternal mortality results mainly from attempts to bear children under life-threatening circumstances including those related to short-birth spacing.

Apart from high maternal mortality, the region is experiencing other forms of death resulting from restiveness, frustration and aggression due to the high rate of unemployment, poverty, diseases related to pollution and environmental degradation (CLO, 1996). In terms of migration, recent events in the Niger Delta reveal that insecurity and uncertainty are pushing people of all ages
away from the area; its economic capacity represented by oil wealth, which was hitherto a sufficient pull factor, has lost its power of attraction for most individuals and groups. Amaechi (2009: 37) described the implications of lawlessness and insecurity thus:

If you live in an environment where laws are not implemented, which means that anybody can just wake up and start killing people and nothing will happen. The result will be that most of the people who live in that society will leave that environment. With the security situation at the time, people began to relocate from Rivers State in groups to Lagos and Abuja. And our economy which is the oil economy began to transfer to Lagos.

This paper argues that the risk of death occasioned by militancy and kidnapping outweighs, by far, the quest for employment among prospective employees. Out-migration is rather more prevalent in these cities that hitherto were in-migrants' choice-destinations. Events indicate that the summary of demographic transition in the Niger Delta is such that the main elements of population change are currently in reverse order compared with their direction before the proliferation of militancy, kidnapping and general insecurity. The region has become a theatre of woes and threnody, making refugees and displaced persons out of some of its former residents in other lands. The consequences of spontaneous migration in a non-regulatory system such as Nigeria has already been highlighted by Nwokocha (2007), to include dislocating the political economy of receiving communities and families, infrastructural decay, housing challenge, maladjustment and de-population/loss of manpower for the origin location.

We hypothesise that post-restive Niger Delta will see the area reverting to the conditions that prevailed prior to the transition, albeit not to a perfect extent. For instance, although in-migration into the area may become higher than what it was during the rebellious period, it would be difficult to predict whether the volume of migration into Niger Delta communities will be as high as, or higher than, it was before the crises. There are two likely scenarios. First, individuals and groups that out-migrated from the region may find it difficult to move back to their former base either because they may have become well established in other locations or may be sceptical about the extent to which peace may have returned to the region or for both reasons. Second, the government may respond positively to the people's demands by resituating the Niger Delta developmentally. In that case, in-migration into relevant communities may surpass the rate in the first stage of the transition.

Framework for Explaining the Niger Delta Situation
Three theoretical perspectives are adopted in explaining the restive situation, and its allied effects, in the Niger Delta – Conflict Theory, Ethno-methodology
and Demographic Transition Theory (DTT). The conflict theory views activism, militancy, thuggery and kidnapping as products of audacious capitalism and overt selfishness that manifest in subjugation and alienation at both micro-individual and macro-society levels leading to surplus value for governments and agencies, including oil companies such as Shell, Chevron, and Mobil on one hand and poverty and powerlessness among individuals and communities of the Niger Delta on the other. As studies (Ikporukpo, 2002; Gbadegesin, 2001; Durotoye, 2000; Osuntokun, 2000; Petters, 2000) have demonstrated, the economic strangulation of the people of the area occasioned by environmental degradation and depletion explains the rediscovery and renewed consciousness away from being a ‘class in-itself’ to a ‘class for itself’. Haralambos & Holborn (2004: 948) have noted:

...a class only becomes a ‘class for itself’ when its members are fully conscious of the true nature of their situation; when they are fully aware of their common interests and common enemy; when they realize that only by concerted action can they overthrow their oppressors; and when they unite and take positive, practical steps to do so. When a class becomes a class for itself, the contradiction between the consciousness of its members and the reality of their situation is ended.

This often sudden realization of the true nature of a negative situation precipitates dialectical relationships which characterize a struggle of opposites, a conflict of contradictions (Ritzer, 2008). In Marx’s view, conflict, which presupposes tension between incompatible forces, provides the source of change which is realizable through unity of purpose. The intensity of such incompatibility could reach a point where the forces collide as is the case of the Niger Delta. In the preceding context, awareness of seeming exploitation and the formation of class for itself progressed from liberal activism to radical protestantism. Consequently, as one restive era, beginning with the abandonment of legitimate means of protest, withered away a succeeding restive-regime created a new set of forces quite different from the preceding ones.

This has been demonstrated in the evolution of restiveness in the region progressing from activism, militancy, political thuggery to kidnapping. In the Niger Delta, obscurity rather than the obliteration of the features of preceding regimes was recorded mainly because some characteristics of a waning protest-regime were present in the incoming, and even in some instances intertwine with them. In the latter sense, the dialectics and contradictions are not absolute. Adoption of some of these anti-normative mechanisms of addressing perceived structural and institutional inequity and marginalization is similar to Merton’s theory of anomie which locates the ability of individuals to adapt to socially structured strain within five behaviour domains (Opara, 1998). Clearly, two of these adaptation approaches, innovation and rebellion, explain attitudes and behaviour of relevant individuals and groups in the region. In this case, both
pathways in seeking reformation of the social structure incidentally challenge it and its norms thereby introducing a new kind of social order.

Ethnomethodology was adopted to complement the conflict perspective. It could be argued that restiveness and disorder in the Niger Delta are indeed products of ethnomethodology, equated with common sense strategy, wherein actors perceive their actions as central to overcoming real or imagined threats. Like the conflict approach, the latter perspective deals with the perception of individuals in a given context and their ability to act as agents of change born out of a conviction on the desirability of an action or a catalogue of actions necessary to catalyze change of the status quo.

The perspective in explaining restiveness in the Niger Delta supposes that individual actors and groups are rational in seeking to maximize benefits while, at the same time, minimizing cost; a kind of Change Belief Model (CBM) that weighs the implications of intended actions and the inherent processes. As such, involvement of people of the area in activism, militancy, thuggery and kidnapping is explained within the context of a common-sense strategy, aimed at overcoming powerlessness, irrespective of whether these perpetrators prioritize the collective aspirations of the people as the last two activities (thuggery and kidnapping) suggest. Our view is that involvement of individuals and groups in political thuggery and kidnapping is rather anti-ethnomethodological and, in turn, undermines the development of the Niger Delta region.

The Effects of Kidnapping on Neighbouring States and Communities
The consequences of kidnapping in the Niger Delta on some neighbouring communities of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo states cannot be overstated. As these events unfolded in the Niger Delta, young people, the majority of who were unemployed in some other locations, adopted hostage-taking for ransom as a quick strategy towards making a living. It could also have been that some kidnappers that were based in the Niger Delta shifted focus to other locations as a means of escaping the wrath of the Joint Task Force (JTF) set up by the government to demobilize individuals and groups involved in the act. As Robert Merton stated, individuals react to circumstances of their existence in different ways including rejection of legitimate goals and means of attaining them (Ritzer, 2008; Haralambos & Holborn, 2004; Opara, 1998).

Classified as rebellious, these kidnappers besieged most state capitals in South-eastern Nigeria and later filtered into rural communities to kidnap specific rural dwellers particularly those perceived as ransom-able by virtue of the perceived economic status of family members. The immediate implications of the above scenario were enormous, ranging from psychological torture among family-members of victims to household economic depletion and in extreme cases the killing of hostages. Indeed, a large number of Igbo people
outside their homelands are discouraged from travelling back home for fear of being kidnapped. Nwokocha (2012: 11) in a study among Igbos in Ibadan, South-west found among others that:

*...factors that motivate Igbo in diaspora to travel home include festivities such as Christmas, Easter, new yam festivals and other sundry customs among the different sub-groups. Indeed, these ceremonies apart from re-uniting families, relatives and friends are also avenues for initiating new projects and searching for life partners.*

Thus, only a few Igbos travel home during these festivals that hitherto pulled all categories of people back to local communities. To be sure, socioeconomic activities were adversely affected, during the period, in places where new relationships were characteristically forged and businesses thrived substantially. In addition, Ajaegbu (2011) clearly noted how kidnapping had undermined remittances from Igbo in Diaspora and by extension socioeconomic development:

*The perception among people in Diaspora is that Nigeria is insecure. Among Igbo communities in particular, kidnapping is a major threat to life and investment especially for people returning home during festive periods. Prior to the escalation of kidnapping, there was hardly any family that did not welcome at least a member for the yuletide. Some of the returnees that came back with some money for projects such as building or renovating a house, setting up businesses for relatives among others were in some cases manhandled and robbed.*

Clearly, such apprehension, whether real or imagined, could explain dwindling remittance rate to Igbo communities. Experience shows that the few that brave coming home during any of the festive periods keep low-profile away from the usual conspicuous-consumption style of living that most of these returnees were known for. Generally, while kidnapping in these neighbouring areas has persisted, Niger Delta communities seem to have witnessed less of such anti-normative behaviour, although some resurgence is currently being observed.

**Intervention Strategies: Can the Code be Broken?**

Answering the above question is particularly necessary but peculiarly difficult considering that, to date, all the programmes introduced by the State to address the Niger Delta question have failed to solve the problems; some have even worsened the people's conditions (Abraham, 2009; Afinotan & Ojakorotu, 2009; Banigo, 2005). Part of the reason for such failures is that the interventions were neither people oriented nor context-specific. They were at best embedded in intuition and unguided conjecture primarily contrived to favour political loyalists or other individuals and groups (Tamunonengi, 2008). For as we note, the goal of intervention programmes was dislocated from the
outset as an adequate and insightful Needs Assessment (NA) of the situation was usually not undertaken prior to project development and implementation.

For the purposes of policy, such assessment should not conceive the Niger Delta as a comity of people whose desires and aspirations could be lumped into an indivisible whole. We note here that in the governance of Nigeria, states in the area were clustered into a unit for administrative convenience. In reality, the zone comprises different peoples and cultures with varying beliefs, traditions, aspirations and challenges. As such, effective needs assessments must constitute in contextualising the specificities of communities and groups.

Consistent failure among different agencies created to address the challenges in Niger Delta explains the people's scepticism about the relevance of subsequent programmes even from inception. For instance, the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) was set up in the 1960s, while the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Committee (OMPDADEC) was created in 1989 when it became clear that the characteristic poverty of the area had not been improved by earlier commissions (Banigo, 2005). This paper argues that the latter agency did not succeed considering that the human, socio-economic and infrastructural underdevelopment of the area continued to deepen. The worsening situation gave impetus to further activism and militancy which played out in protests, rallies, continuous restiveness and community agitations. As with other commissions before it, OMPDADEC dwindled into insignificance until its eventual predictable demise.

The creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, which followed the same old pattern of haphazardness, has not shown any capacity at breaking the jinx of retrogression in the region. Consequently, scepticism, distrust and restiveness are still part of the Niger Delta dilemma for which the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was constituted (Dan-Jumbo, 2006). It is noted here that the latter commission appears to be a genuine preliminary step at addressing the issues, as aggrieved persons and groups had the opportunity of stating their grievances. The quest to find a lasting solution to the problems of the region led to the creation of the Niger Delta Ministry, by the Federal Government of Nigeria in October 2008 (Peterside, 2009). It is pertinent to ask at this point whether that ministry is all that is needed to ensure lasting peace and equity in the region.

While this paper subscribes to the inherent necessity of such a ministry whose functions and responsibilities are meant to be entirely spatially specific to the region, it argues that its success will depend largely on how far it is able to take into account the micro-level idiosyncrasies of ethnic groups and communities in the Niger Delta. The point of incursion and strategy for disentangling the dilemma should be at increasing the confidence levels of the people by adopting the participatory approach wherein they really become part of the entire re-situation process from the very beginning. In this way, the
actual needs of the people, at each point in time, can be ascertained and sufficiently addressed.

This paper considers the amnesty extended to militants in the area as one of the necessary steps towards resolving the protracted restiveness in the area. It is important to also state that beyond amnesty, the core issues of under-development, notably mass poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and lack of basic amenities, should be directly addressed to forestall a reoccurrence of militancy and its concomitant variants. With sustained peace in the region occasioned by a positive transformation, the code of restiveness, insecurity and unpredictability would be broken, to the extent that sustainable peace and development could be achieved with minimal efforts since resources are already in abundance.

**Conclusion**

This paper has shown clearly that the Niger Delta region is the epitome of avoidable contradictions and tenuous demographic transition. With its abundant natural resources and particularly its oil deposits, which have made Nigeria the sixth largest producer of oil in the world, the area and its people are still embedded in pervasive and extreme poverty. The people’s frustration continues to increase as the dividends of governance continue to elude them, even when it is evident that some other communities outside the region are making appreciable developmental strides, arguably from the resources accruing from the Niger Delta. Perceived government insensitivity and neglect found expression in attempts by individuals and groups to devise illegitimate mechanisms to showcase their grievances. The people’s agony was exacerbated by periodic formation of widely perceived deceptive agencies whose modus operandi was, *ab initio*, enmeshed in haphazardness that further sustained inequity that deepens underdevelopment of the Niger Delta.

Initially designed as palliative measures against revolutionary tendencies of the people, the agencies and their inherent delusiveness, instead, triggered-off contradictions that made their failure, soon after establishment, apparent. Consequently, restiveness became a part of the people’s existence. Such negative reorientation explains the dilemma and uncertainty witnessed in the region and the evolution of illegitimacies such as militancy, political *thuggery* and kidnapping. However, the contradiction of these nouveau strategies lies in the fact that they constitute in themselves antithesis to the survival of the region at the macro level.

We conclude that the country is, perhaps, on the verge of finding a lasting solution to the Niger Delta problem through the introduction of a ministry whose sole responsibility is to address the concerns of the region. However, it needs to be stated that the benefits of the Niger Delta ministry will only be realizable in an atmosphere of sincerity among stakeholders who must be genuinely committed to bringing about the desired change. The amnesty granted to Niger Delta militants is essential for achieving peace in the region, an atmosphere necessary to guarantee meaningful planning and implement-
tation of development projects. It is hoped that this gesture by the government will ultimately translate into a kind of Rostow's precondition for takeoff that will ultimately impinge positively on the peoples and communities of the Niger Delta. This would eventually reverse the demographic profile of the area which has for some time been characterized by high rates of morbidity, avoidable deaths and out-migration.

References


