5 Adebayo M. A. Ninalowo
Conceptual and Existential Juxtaposition of the Notion of Failed State

26 Remi Aiyede
Federalism, Oil Politics and Human Security in Nigeria

56 Azeez Olaniyan
Africa's Great Green Wall Project and the Lessons of History

73 Mmaduabuchi Okeke & Kelechi Nwogu
The Politics of Monetary Integration in ECOWAS: Issues and Challenges

100 'Dele Ashiru
Foreign Aid and Development in Nigeria

128 Ferdinand O. Ottoh
The French Intervention in Mali: Exploring Motives and Consequences

160 Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb
Representative Government and the Imperative for Civil Society Intervention in Nigeria's Fourth Republic
Abstract
Based on the salience of religion in public life in Nigeria, alongside the pervasiveness of corruption in the country, it has become imperative to research into the relationship, if any, between religion and corruption and determine if the former has or can have any impact on stemming the later. This is based on a widely held assumption that religion is often positive. In looking at the influence of religion on attitudes to corruption in Nigeria and based on the contents of the research instrument employed for this study, the paper presents findings from the study according to analytical categories. Thus, it discusses respondents' perception of religion and morality (ethics); as well as examines the divide, if at all, between public and private morality; the definitions/explanations of corruption in the religions; religious beliefs and personal attitudes to corruption; the influence that tradition and modernity may or may not have on corruption; corruption, gender and youth and the role of FBOs and anti-corruption agencies in corruption abatement or promotion. It concludes that while the three main religions under study in Nigeria explicitly condemn corruption, they do not seem to impact or influence attitudes to corruption in any major way. Furthermore, the fact that religious people and religious houses often roundly denounce corruption has not brought about any moderation or diminution of corrupt tendencies in the public space. The paper then pulls together some suggestions for ways to use religion to mitigate the scourge of corruption.

Key Words: (Anti) Corruption, Faith Based Organisations, Christianity, Islam, African Traditional Religion.
UNILAG Journal of Politics is a biannual journal in political and social science research. It also welcomes interdisciplinary contributions which focus on issues that impact on humanity.

Editorial Committee

Editor-in-Chief: Professor Solomon O. Akinboye
Managing Editor: Adelaja O. Odukoya, Ph.D.

Editorial Assistants
O. Eesuola, Ph.D. A. N. Eneanya, Ph.D.
M. O. Quadri, Ph.D. F. A. Odubajo, Ph.D.

Editorial Board

Professor Adigun Agbaje
Department of Political Science
University of Ibadan
Oyo State.

Professor L. Adele Jinadu
Centre for Advanced Social Science
(CASS), Port Harcourt
Rivers State.

Professor Nuhu Yaqub
University of Abuja
Abuja.

Professor G. Aforka Nweke
Department of Political Science
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
Anambra State.

Professor Siyanbola Tomori
Department of Economics
University of Lagos
Akoka, Lagos.

Professor Amadu Sesay
Department of International Relations
Obafemi Awolowo University
Ile-Ife, Osun State.

Professor Robert Ola
Adekunle Ajasin University
Akungba-Akoko
Ondo State.

Professor Remi Anifowose
Department of Political Science
University of Lagos.

Professor Babatunde Babawale
Dean, Students Affairs
University of Lagos
Akoka, Lagos.

Information for Contributors

The Unilag Journal of Politics is a biannual journal in political science research. It however welcomes multi disciplinary contributions which focus on research methodological issues, regional and global issues, social, political and economic issues as well as technological and development issues as they relate to and affect Africa and Africans.

The journal hopes to contribute to the universal struggle for justice, equity and the establishment of a world of harmony and peace. In particular, it intends to provide a platform for critical and vibrant intellectual confrontation on ontological and epistemological issues in
social and political science research. This will be a tremendous contribution to the discipline (political science) as well as to better understanding of Africa's development/underdevelopment crisis.

**Manuscript Requirements and Acceptance for Publication**

*Unilag Journal of Politics* is a peer-reviewed publication with manuscripts anonymously assessed by at least two referees. Submission of manuscripts to the *Unilag Journal of Politics* implies that the author is committed to publishing in the journal. It also presupposes that the same article is not being simultaneously submitted to any other publication nor has it been published elsewhere with a content that is evidently similar.

Articles being submitted for publication should have 15-25 double-spaced pages with approximately 250 words per page.

Research reports and book review essays submitted must not be longer than 13 double-spaced pages.

All manuscripts must be written in English and must conform to the APSA style sheet and the Chicago Manual of Style in their bibliographical references. For example:


**Correspondence**

Articles for submission should be sent to Dr. Adelaja Odukoya, Managing Editor, *Unilag Journal of Politics*, Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Akoka, Yaba, Lagos, Nigeria, (01) 5454891-3 (ext.1334).

**Subscription**

Information regarding subscription should be addressed to—
Dr. Adelaja Odukoya, Managing Editor, Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Akoka, Yaba, Lagos. (01) 5454891-3, ext.1334. E-mail: lajaodukoya@yahoo.com or unilag_politicus@yahoo.com. Our website is www.unilagjournalofpolitics.org

Annual subscription fee for individuals is ₦1,000 or US$10.

Institutional subscription is ₦2,000 or U$420.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 5     | **Adebayo M. A. Ninalowo**  
Conceptual and Existential Juxtaposition of the Notion of Failed State |
| 26    | **E. Remi Aiyede**  
Federalism, Oil Politics and Human Security in Nigeria |
| 56    | **Azeez Olaniyan**  
Africa's Great Green Wall Project and the Lessons of History |
| 73    | **G. S. Mmaduabuchi Okeke & Kelechi Nwogu**  
The Politics of Monetary Integration in ECOWAS: Issues and Challenges |
| 100   | **’Dele Ashiru**  
Foreign Aid and Development in Nigeria |
| 128   | **Ferdinand O. Ottoh**  
The French Intervention in Mali: Exploring Motives and Consequences |
| 160   | **Ibraheem Oladipo Muheeb**  
Representative Government and the Imperative for Civil Society Intervention in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic |
Federalism, Oil Politics and Human Security in Nigeria

E. REMI AIYEDE*

Abstract

This paper investigates how the institution of federalism and the deeply conflictual issue of natural resource exploitation are implicated in the drive for human security in Nigeria. The paper links the literature on geographical determinants of conflicts and violence with the literature on the political determinants of conflict and violence by exploring the institution of federalism as a framework for addressing human security problems in the context of a natural resource driven economy. The paper argues that political institutions are central to achieving human security; therefore, the human security concept must incorporate and account for political institutions for it to address the domestic dimension of the issues. In the Nigerian case, as well as other fragile states, an engagement with federalism as a tool for conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and guaranteed stability is essential. External human security intervention must take into account the institutional architecture of the state in order for it to promote institution building and sustainability. In such a situation, state institutions and agencies must be recognised and utilised alongside non-state, non-formal organisations in order to avoid the fostering of disengagement or reinforcement of a shadow state which may further undermine state legitimacy and deepen existing distrust between state and citizens.

Introduction

CONFLICTS triggered by competition for natural resources are inevitable in society. They result from disagreements and disputes over access to control and use of

* Aiyede is of the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.
natural resources. Such conflicts often arise because people have different uses for resources such as forests, water, pastures and land, or because they want to manage them in different ways. Disagreements also arise when the interests and needs of users are conflicting or when the priorities of some user groups are not considered in policies, programmes and projects. Furthermore, recent studies of conflict and peace have emphasized the role of natural resources as harbingers of conflicts. Natural resources such as oil and diamonds have been linked to poor governance, political instability and violent conflict.

The availability of natural resources, especially lootable resources such as diamonds, account for the elongation and sustenance of civil wars (Collier 2001; Le Billion 2003; Ross 2004; Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeftler, Rey-Querol, and Sembanis 2003; Collier and Hoefler 2004; Fearon 2005). In addition, the challenge posed by natural resources in a context of ethnic fractionalization, such as in Nigeria, increases the likelihood of civil conflict (Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005; Tusalem and Morrison 2014). Although oil is not considered a lootable resource in these studies, the resort to oil bunkering, piracy and kidnapping by insurgents in the Niger Delta show that oil resources can be both the basis of conflict and a resource for non-state actors in the prolongation of violent conflict and political instability. This dynamic therefore force us to address the issues from a human security perspective.

In this paper, I argue that there is a crucial link between the institution of federalism and the effort to achieve human security. In this context, I conceive individual security as the foundation of the state. I examine the role of the politics of oil in human security conditions in Nigeria, paying attention to the particular federal context. This is done to show how the institution of federalism and the deeply conflictual issue of natural resource exploitation are implicated in the drive for human security. This essay argues that political institutions,
in particular federalism, are central to achieving human security, as an organising framework for conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction and for guaranteeing stability in a fragile state like Nigeria if utilized responsibly by political leaders. I propose a focus on the linkage between human security and federalism because insights provided by studies of federalism in relation to conflict management and the new political economy of federal preservation focus on fostering prosperity, while system self-restriction in federal systems effectively provides a linkage to the human security concept.

The Human Security and Federalism Nexus

All over the world security has become a constant item of discussion and news. To the non-export national, security conjures images of bomb blasts, kidnappings, military invasions, suicide bombers walking into busy cafes, infectious computer viruses, or the crash of stock markets. These things dominate our thinking about national security and are of great national security concern. However, they suggest that security problems are to be attributed only to human machinations. Considering widespread natural disasters, tsunamis and earthquakes, security is not only about man-made threats; it is equally about natural threats. Thus, the central concern of security is the threat to welfare.

Security is about how we guarantee survival and protection against threats to our existence and stability. Traditionally, security is conceived in national terms and usually in relation to the state. Lipman (1943:25) asserts that “a nation is secure to the extent that it is not in danger of having to sacrifice her core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able if challenged to maintain them by victory in such war.” In this wise, security is conceived in terms of the ability of a state to withstand aggression from abroad, preserve itself against threats to its sovereignty and protect its vital interests against threats. In this sense, security is viewed as security of the state. Security seems to make sense in the context of an anarchic global system.
of states. In this context, threat to national security comes from the military power of other states. Security then refers to the ability of the state to protect itself by military power.

One important element of this traditional concept of national security is the state as the reference point of security. This means that the use of force and the threat of force is at the heart of this conception of security. The military, with its firepower, dominates this conception of security because it is about the state; hence, the importance of warfare as the focus of security and strategic studies. This view of security dominated the immediate post-World War II era and was defined largely by an understanding of international relations during the Cold War, between the Soviet Union and the United States, the two major powers that emerged from and became ideological rivals after World War II. In the context of the Cold War, security was conceived to be achieved through the use of military, economic and political power as well as the exercise of diplomacy. The concept evolved largely from the US, emphasizing military might, but came to encompass a broad range of elements that affect the military security of a nation and its core values (Laswell 1950; Wolfers 1960; Brown 1983).

In the late sixties, however, the thinking about national security began to change. National security began to be conceived in broad and non-military terms and scholars began to admit that the distinction between high and low politics associated with the dominance of the Cold War in security calculations had been erased (McNamara 1968; Ullman 1983; Mathews 1989; Buzan 1991; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). In the case of Africa, Colliers (2004:9) observes that state security is not threatened by conventional armed attack by other countries “but by more insidious measures many of which flow from the very weakness of the state and its absence of control over its territory.”

The assumption of the traditional view of security is that the state is a container of security, ensuring the security of the
people within it, but in reality individual citizens actually face many threats arising either directly or indirectly from the state. The state can be a threat to the security of its citizens rather than being their protector. This is evident under military or other forms of dictatorship in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere.

This reality is captured by Weaver (1995) who talks about ‘securitization’, that is, how an actor transform an issue into a security matter. It is the state that defines a matter as a security issue and in “naming a certain development as a security problem, the state can claim a special right, one that will, in the first instance, always be defined by the state and its elites.” National security must therefore not lose sight of this paradox in state-citizen relations. This argument has justified the shift in the understanding of security from a state-centred view to a people or society-centred view of security. That is why Booth (1991:319) argues further that security is emancipation:

‘Security’ means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.

These new ways of thinking about security crystallised into what is now referred to as human security. The concept of human security was first used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1994) to refer to

...safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to peoples' rights, their safety or even their lives. From a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world,
taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or government. Like other security concepts – national security, economic security, food security – it is about protection. Human security thus entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerabilities to threats to freedom, safety and livelihoods. It is about minimizing risks and taking remedial action where preventive measures fail.

The United Nations Commission on Human Security (2003) notes in its maiden report that human security is a concept that combines “human protection and development and interconnects peace, security and sustainable development.” It emphasizes that human security should not focus on the macro – or state – level but also on the community and individual levels. Tigerstrom (2007) draws our attention to the convergence of ideas from security studies and international development concerns over the impact policies are having on individuals as framing the concept of human security.

In practice, threats to human security could be identified to include economic threats, food threats, health threats, environmental threats, personal threats, community threats, political threats, demographic threats, crime in all forms including terrorism, natural disasters, violent conflicts and wars, genocide, anti-personnel mines, etc. They demand new means for addressing security, such as humanitarian intervention or humanitarian help, peacekeeping operations, peace building, arms verification operations, respect for human rights and liberties, sustainable economic development, early warning, diplomatic missions, focused (smart) sanctions, preventive deployment of armed forces, preventive diplomacy, stronger civil society, empowerment strategies, assuring the minimal life standards, and so on (Prezelj (2008). The differences in practice are presented by Prezelj in tabular form, Table 1 next page.
Table 1: Comparison of Human and Traditional Security Concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security for whom (referent object)</th>
<th>Traditional national security</th>
<th>Human security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily states</td>
<td>Primarily individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values at stake (security of what values)</td>
<td>Territorial integrity and national independence</td>
<td>Personal safety and individual freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security from what (threats and risks)</td>
<td>Traditional threats (military threats, violence by countries...)</td>
<td>Non-traditional and also traditional threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security by what means</td>
<td>Force as the primary instrument of security, To be used unilaterally for a state's own safety</td>
<td>Force as a secondary instrument, to be used primarily for cosmopolitan ends and collectively; sanctions, human development, and humane governance as key instruments of individual-centred security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balance of power is important; power is equated with military capabilities.</td>
<td>Balance of power is of limited utility; soft power is increasingly important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation between states is tenuous beyond alliance relations.</td>
<td>Cooperation between states, international organisations and NGOs can be effective and sustained.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prezelj (2008:5).

Thus, human security is comprehensive, encompassing the traditional integrity of the state or national independence in addition to a fundamental focus on the personal safety and freedom of the individual. Furthermore, the instruments of human security are human development and humane governance. In this context, the soft power tools of diplomacy, cooperation and multilateralism are very important relative to the use of force or hard-power. It attempts to capture military and non-military threats and the means of dealing with them.
Federalism is increasingly becoming popular as a framework of government in many parts of the world and in post-conflict reconstruction in several African states. Furthermore, discussions of federalism have engaged the institution as it relates to the achievement of prosperity and state self-preservation. Certain elements of federalism are portrayed as conducive to the requirements of building markets and achieving economic growth. This discussion of federalism is also related to state-society relations and the effort to build effective and stable states. At the heart of these concerns is the desire to guarantee for citizens, especially those in fragile, multi-ethnic or divided societies, a secure environment for the enjoyment of productive life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the face of the threats posed by social diversity and scarce resources. Thus, there is a vital link between the institution of federalism and the effort to achieve human security, with the latter being premised on the idea that individual security is the foundation of the state.

While scholars have tried to link human security to political institutions, most of the efforts have been concentrated on building the international political architecture for, and principles of governance at the regional and global levels especially as associated with humanitarian intervention. There has been no serious engagement with how specific political institutional forms and values relate to the conceptualization and practice of human security. Yet an exploration of the theoretical linkages between federalism and human security provide a conceptual framework to examine human security from the perspective of factors and likely interventions internal to the state.

A federal system of government is designed to foster unity among the sub-units that constitute the federation, while also preserving their autonomy in some areas. According to Riker (1964:11), federalism is a structural bargain that involves the existence of at least two levels of government that govern the same land and people, with each level having its autonomous
spheres of authority and with the autonomy of each sphere constitutionally guaranteed and protected. In a federal system, the constitution creates at least two tiers of government each of which is assigned a range of governmental powers that it can exercise exclusively or jointly with the other tier. Federalism or the federal system presents ample opportunities for elected representatives of different groups or units within the federation to come together to discuss their differences, articulate the interests of their various constituencies and manage conflicts for the overall objective of forging a united country. In a heterogeneous society, federalism has to balance state-society relations by fostering equality and equity, as well as justice and fair play among the sub-units that make up the federation. This act of balance act should also extend to the states collectively. The federal government has to mobilize resources and redistribute for the balanced growth and development of the constituent units.

With regard to the mobilization of resources and their equitable use for development of the country, the notion of fiscal federalism is critical. Fiscal federalism describes the assignment of powers over resource allocation and revenue-raising decisions among levels of government. It relates to the division of public sector functions and finances in a logical way among multiple layers of government. It deals with problems that arise from the situation of divided political jurisdictions within an economically integrated state system relating to determination of the appropriate functions and finances of the various tiers of government. How possible can this be done efficiently and complementarily to maximize the welfare of the political community? Federalism specifically requires sub-national governments that are institutionalized and deeply embedded in society in order to increase the capacity of government to achieve security and welfare, and effectively respond to the aspiration of citizens (Ziblatt 2004).

How federalism achieves these objectives has been a source of debate. Scholars have suggested a variety of conditions
and institutional arrangements by which federal maintenance is achieved. Traditional discussions of federal maintenance emphasise such institutional devices as power-sharing, the structure of the legislature, executive power and electoral system and so on, as noted earlier, the new political economy of federal preservation emphasises economic principles such as competition and efficiency that preserve markets – hence market-preserving federalism (Weingast 1995; McKinnon 1995; Rodden and Wibbels 2002; Ejobowah 2005; Aiyede 2009).

Thus, from the latter perspective, federalism constitutes a framework for managing natural resources in a state. Federations are relatively efficient: (1) in the provision of public services; (2) in aligning costs and benefits of government for a diverse citizenry and, thereby ensuring more equity in so far as citizens get what they pay for and pay for what they get; and (3) in achieving fits between public goods and their spatial characteristics, especially the variable economies of scale of different kinds of public goods. Federations also ensure: (4) increased competition, experimentation and innovation in the government sector, and (5) foster the authority and capacity to respond to those preferences. (6) in addition to being transparent and close to the citizen and accountable in policymaking. Finally, federations reflect (7) sensitivity to sub-national regional concerns, including the power of constituent governments to provide for their own needs (identified by Kincaid 2001:88). Thus, federalism ensures macroeconomic stability, promotes experimentation and innovativeness that enhance supply of the ingredients of human security.

Human security, like federalism, is an integrative concept that is relevant to a wide range of areas. While traditional security emphasises “the security of states from external military threats,” human security emphasises “the security of the individual human beings who inhabit states, and their protection from a wide range of threats, from military and criminal violence to hunger and disease.” Similarly, federalism seeks to achieve a strong state able to support
human security elements by recognising difference and diversity in the framework of decentralised rule. Security is both an objective condition and a social construction. Federalism deals with both conditions. This is achieved in the constitution of a large state able to mobilise resources to provide a large market and common defence of the territorial state and the assurance it gives to minorities and diverse groups within the state by providing space for self-rule and self-determination for such groups. This connection is apparent in Walker’s (1997:62) observation that “claims about security are a serious matter. They cannot be dissociated from more basic claims about who we think we are and how we might act together”. Thus, the way and manner through which human security is practised must reckon with the objectives and goals of political institutions. These institutions may constrain or facilitate intervention policies and actions designed to achieve human security, which may be broadly coextensive with the objectives of the state itself.

Federal devices such as affirmative action, power sharing, and revenue sharing seek to address inequity at the individual and group levels within the national state to ensure that individuals and groups are guaranteed freedom from fear and want. Federalism addresses historical disadvantages that might be glossed over by a focus on individual rights, by carrying on board group rights and claims such as those that relate to environmental resources and cultural identities that often precipitate conflicts. Federalism as a conflict management mechanism engages the fact that security concerns may emerge from cultural identities, contestations over ownership and use of natural resources and their consequential social and economic redistribution.

Importantly too, studies on the linkage between natural resources and violent conflict emphasise ethnic heterogeneity as a factor that exacerbates the challenge of competition for natural resources and suggests the need to properly harness natural resources, invest in the military, promote social
programmes in order to balance state-society relations and guarantee human and social capital accumulation as hedge against violent conflict (Tusalem and Morrison 2014:169). Indeed, they often point to the institution of a developmental state because it is believed that only such a state can carry out the necessary social and capital investment programme that can guarantee stability.

However, the studies are often not inward-looking because of the focus on geographic determinants of violent conflict; they hardly investigate the internal institutional framework of governance and therefore do not gain from the vast studies available on the political determinants of violent conflict. As Wegenast (2013) has noted, there is a need to unify studies on the geographical determinants of violent conflicts with the literature on the political determinants of violent conflict. The latter has shown that political institutions hold the power to mitigate conflict and that the effects of institutions may vary according to contexts. Studies on the political determinants of conflicts have provided valuable insight on property rights, electoral systems, electoral competition, structure of the legislature, executive power and federalism as institutional determinants of internal conflict and violence. With regard to federalism, the rules of co-optation and power sharing are found to appease social forces by incorporating regional elites, thereby reducing violence (Lijphart 1999, Wiesehoneier 2008).

With regard to Nigeria, Aiyede (2012) has shown how power sharing and rotation of public offices have helped to ensure, albeit precariously, some measure of balance in post-civil war Nigeria, especially after the annulled presidential election of 1993. There is therefore a need to investigate how the institutional arrangement of federalism may shape the interaction between state and society in the context of large natural resource revenues. In this light, this paper argues that federalism provides a framework and opportunity for addressing rebellion arising from the exploitation of natural resources.
Religious extremism (especially the Boko Haram insurgency), Nigeria’s current major security challenge, has been ascribed to the poor management of Nigeria’s resources. During his visit to Nigeria in 2013, President Bill Clinton attributed the Boko Haram insurgency and religious extremism in the northern part of the country to poverty, which he insisted was the result of the mismanagement of Nigeria’s resources by its leaders (Oyeweso 2013). Indeed, the then Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, provoked a heated debate in the media concerning the cause of terrorism in the northern part of the country when he ascribed such extremism to the high level of unemployment and poverty in the area. According to him, “indeed, the security situation in this part of the country is fundamentally linked to the absence of job opportunities and to the quality of life of the people. Unless these real economic issues are addressed, we will not likely find a long-lasting solution to the political and security problems” (Onuba and Adesomoju 2013). In the ensuing debate, questions were raised about the wide differences in the distribution of national revenue among states because most states depend on allocations from centralised oil revenue for administration and development programmes.

In the debates, it became clear that Boko Haram activities have been intense in states with very high levels of poverty in the country as shown in Table 1. Boko Haram activities have been prevalent in the North East and the North West, two zones with the highest rates of poverty. The average poverty rate in the North West geopolitical zone is 71.4%, which remains the highest in the country. The North East region and the North Central region, which have 69.1% and 60.7% respectively, follow it. Poverty is least dominant in the South West (49.8%), South-South (55.5%), and South East regions (59.5%). Over half of all children in the northern part of the country are stunted. While 41% of all children under five are classified as stunted, 23% are severely stunted. The human impact of this is devastating. Poverty-induced malnutrition is
commonplace with 54% of its people living below the poverty line.

Table 1: Geographical Distribution of Poverty in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Poverty rates (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South South</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Bureau of Statistics

With youths constituting well over 60 percent of Nigeria’s population and with declining opportunities in paid employment, one of the major challenges confronting Nigeria is how to provide jobs for hundreds of thousands of this segment of its population who graduate from schools annually. The number of unemployed members of the labour force continues to grow from 12.3 percent in 2006 to 23.9 percent in 2011. Thus, despite its growing economy, the proportion of Nigerians living in poverty is increasing.

The question has been whether poverty is sufficient to explain terrorism and whether it provides a justification for engaging in acts of rebellion against the state. There are also arguments about the causes of the huge disparity in poverty levels across the states. That is, whether this disparity can be attributed to political corruption and incompetence of the political leadership in the North or the skewed revenue distribution formula that is said to have generated huge disparities between the expenditure powers of the sub-units (states) and those of the national government, or between the revenue allocated to oil-bearing states with small populations and the non-oil bearing states in the North with huge populations (Omoh 2012). The point of emphasis here is that there is a
linkage between the design of the institutions of government and the quest to achieve human security. This has so far not been interrogated in the effort to address the human security issues at the theoretical level.

Oil Politics in the Nigerian Federation

The Nigerian government adopted the federal idea as far back as 1951, under the Macpherson Constitution. The Lyttelton Constitution of 1954 introduced a full federal system of government following agreements reached by the colonial government (British officials) with the leaders of Nigeria's political parties of that time – Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (Northern Peoples Congress), Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons) and Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Action Group). The federal system of government introduced in 1954 comprised three regions (North, East and West). The Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), led by the late Sir Ahmadu Bello, won control of the Northern Regional Government. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe won in the East, while Chief Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group controlled the regional government in the West. Since then federal principles have been used to bind the various centrifugal forces in Nigeria.

The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) has been linked to the discovery and exploitation of oil in commercial quantity (Adejumobi and Aderemi 2002, Obi 2005). Indeed, the strategic importance of oil became initially visible during the Civil War. When the Igbo declared Biafra, the new country included the minority oil-producing communities, even though the consent of these non-Igbo minority communities were never sought before the secession was declared. The Nigerian government, which had hitherto paid deaf ears to cries of domination by these ethnic minorities, quickly divided the country into twelve states, with the minority oil-producing states put into two states, Rivers and Bendel. This action raised the hopes of autonomy for the minority communities
within the Nigerian federal structure and they quickly joined the Nigerian effort to quell the secession attempt by Biafra (Adejumobi and Aderemi 2002; Obi 2005). But as I will discuss presently, oil exploitation was to account largely for the protracted conflicts in the Niger Delta (Obi 2005; Aiyede 2006).

As noted earlier, the use of territorial disaggregation began with the policy of state creation during the civil war to win the support of minority ethnic groups in the south eastern part of Nigeria. Since then, Nigeria’s federal system has developed through disaggregation. The three major regions became four in 1963, from which 12 states were created in 1967, 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1996 and 36 states since 1996, including the Federal Capital Territory. However, state creation, which was very successful in dousing the fears of the minority groups at the inception of the Civil War in 1967, became an instrument for their further marginalisation by successive military rulers when political considerations emerged as the basis for the creation of additional states. Yet since the return to civil rule in 1999, intergovernmental relations within a federal context have provided a framework through which the grievances and preferences of the Niger Delta have been pursued.

At independence Nigeria’s public revenue was largely derived from the export of agricultural produce such as cocoa, cotton, rubber and groundnut. However, with the discovery and exploitation of oil the economic structure changed, oil gradually became the single most important material base of the Nigerian state, accounting for over 70 percent of total revenue and 76 percent of total exports. It thus became the lifeline of the state’s activities: bureaucracy, defence, infrastructure and social services.

The rapid expansion of the oil sector transformed the Nigerian economy into a mono-mineral economy, the state into a rentier state and the population into consumers rather than producers, underlined by a constant struggle for access to oil resources. Not only did the struggles divert attention from
other productive activities, cheap oil money was also the source of corruption and capital flight, rendering Nigeria a typical case of the resource curse syndrome. In the struggle, the majority ethnic groups became the dominant players in politics while the minority peoples and communities from where oil is exploited suffered neglect and severe externalities.

The struggle is particularly reflected in the practice of fiscal federalism. The changes made in the revenue allocation formula have reflected policy choices that did not favour the minority oil-producing communities. Since the ascendancy of oil as the major source of revenue, derivation has increasingly become insignificant as a factor of allocation of revenue. Oil producing communities, largely minority communities, became marginalised in development projects and revenue allocation even as they struggled to protect their interests. They were deprived of control over oil resources while suffering the adverse consequences of their exploitation. Thus, a major conflict that is yet to end exploded over the control of oil resources and the revenue allocation formula within the Nigerian federation. Given the dominance of oil in the economy, any threat to oil exploitation becomes a threat to the state. Being particularly subject to the vagaries of the international oil market as expressed in the balance of payment crisis that it continues to suffer since the oil glut of the early 1980s, the state is committed to ensuring that local efforts to disrupt oil production is stopped with all the powers at its disposal (Obi 1998; Aiyede 2006).

The conflict over the modalities for the extraction of oil, the management of oil revenue, especially the distribution of oil revenue, therefore hit at the security of the state, as oil-producing communities questioned the legitimacy of the state and its actions. The activities of militant groups, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), with their violent confrontations with the state, eroded state security in the traditional sense and thus eroded human security. The Niger Delta became characterised for many
years as an arena of violence, where social dislocation combined with deprivation and fear are defining elements, as the consciousness and feelings of being victims became widespread among natives of these oil-producing communities (Osaghae 1995). Ibeanu, I. (2006) identifies the numerous negative environmental impacts of oil mining and refining on the communities. They include pollution from oil spillage that destroys marine life and crops, and makes water and farmlands unsuitable for the livelihood activities of the people; brine from oil fields which contaminates water and streams making them unfit as sources of drinkable water; gas flaring in the vicinity of human dwellings and high pressure oil pipelines that form a mesh across farmlands leading to acid rains, deforestation and destruction of wildlife; and the dumping of toxic, non-biodegradable by-products of oil refining dangerous to both flora and fauna, including man.

While the strategy of safeguarding oil production has involved use of the-carrot-and-stick approach, force dominated the action of the government in practice. Ibeanu (2002) explains that state aggression directed at the Niger Delta has taken four main forms, namely: constant harassment of the leaders of popular movements and organisations; instigating inter-communal conflicts, especially along ethnic, religious and clan lines, instigating internal divisions of popular organisations and direct repression using the army and the police. Thus, efforts by oil communities in pursuit of environmental and social justice have largely been met with state violence by successive military regimes.

The high point of state violence was the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP leaders (the Ogoni Nine) on 10 November 1995 during the Sani Abacha military regime. Saro-Wiwa’s appeal was still pending before the Court of Appeal and the Federal High Court when he was executed. The same brutality was unleashed in 1999 under civil rule when Odi, an oil-producing community in the Niger Delta, was completely razed by soldiers on the orders of President Obasanjo in
reaction to the kidnap and killing of seven policemen by armed youths in the community. Scores of innocent people were killed; thousands were rendered homeless and became refugees and displaced persons in their own communities. The national government has also visibly supported the use of mercenaries by oil corporations in defence of their installations, an action that was challenged by the Delta State government in October 2003 (Aiyede 2006).

Apart from strong-arm tactics, the national government, under pressure from the international human rights community, increasing violent agitations by the youth of the oil-producing communities, multilateral organisations (the United Nations, Commonwealth) and the global civil society movement, has set up structures to positively respond to the needs of the Niger Delta peoples. In 1988, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) was set up by the national government to deal with environmental problems in the oil sector and other areas. In 1993, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPDAEC) was established to provide infrastructures and social amenities as part of the effort to respond specifically to the development needs of the Niger Delta region after several years of claims that the terrain of the region was too expensive and difficult to develop. Several laws and regulations were then provided to prevent spillages and gas flaring by imposing liabilities for such occurrences on the oil companies. Then in 2000, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was set up to replace OMPDAEC due to the failure of the latter to achieve the objectives for which it was set up (Obi 1997; Osaghae 1995).

In spite of these measures, the Niger Delta remained a hotbed of violence and a high level of militarisation given the level of access of the youths to light weapons and the heavy and sustained presence of troops of the Nigerian military. Interestingly, the focus of the agitation of the Niger Delta people then shifted largely from increase in the percentage of derivation to outright resource control. The situation was
worsened by what appears to be a deliberate move by the political elite from the region to instigate the youth to step up such demands, and the fact that criminal elements have penetrated popular organisations in pursuit of the former’s own interests (Mahler 2010).

Under civil rule since 1999, Nigeria’s state governors have formed various fora to pursue their varying interests through the federal process. For instance, the Summit of Governors and Members of the National Assembly from the South-South Geo-Political Zone, largely oil-bearing states, pressed for states’ control of resources. They demanded that the Land Use Act and other laws, which empower the Federal Government to control the natural resources found in the territories of their communities, be abolished. They also contested the distinction between offshore and onshore oil in the implementation of the 13 percent derivation revenue allocation to oil-producing states by the Federal Government by insisting that offshore oil belongs to the communities. The Federal Government maintains that offshore resources belong to the Federation.

They pursued this position through a series of public declarations and communiqués. However, a bill tabled before the House of Representatives on 9 May 2001 by Senator Harriman from Delta State and 13 others which sought several amendments to the Petroleum Act failed after a tempestuous session. It was thrown out with an 81 ‘No’ votes against 64 ‘Yes’ votes along a sharp North-South divide. The bill was to compel oil companies to site their headquarters in their main areas of operation and to vest the ownership and control of petroleum resources in the oil-producing states, local governments and communities. It was hoped that these measures would reduce tension, poverty and violence in the oil-producing communities (Aiyede 2001).

Following the stalemate created by the events in the National Assembly, the Olusegun Obasanjo-led administration instituted a suit, asking the Supreme Court to declare that
“the natural resources located within the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf of Nigeria are, subject to the provision of any treaty or other written agreement between Nigeria and any neighbouring littoral foreign state, derived from the federation and not from any state” (Djebah 2001: 9). Clearly, this was a response to the demand by oil-producing states in the country that there should be no dichotomy between offshore and onshore oil in the calculation of the 13 per cent revenue allocation based on derivation.

In a decision made on April 5, 2002, the Supreme Court declared that the littoral states could not legally seek to control natural resources located beyond their seaward boundaries. It however also declared unconstitutional the Federal Government’s refusal to begin sharing of the 13 percent derivation formula from May 1999, and First Line Deduction System (FLDS), the latter a procedure whereby the Federal Government first deducts a percentage of funds credited to the Federation Account for the payment of debt before sharing the balance among the Federal, State and Local Governments, among others.

The first decision threatened to aggravate conflict in the oil-producing communities such that President Obasanjo had to adopt a political solution by sending an appropriate bill to the National Assembly. This bill, which was signed into law in early 2004, abolished the dichotomy often made between offshore and onshore oil in the distribution of revenue. These moves did not however alter the agitations in the Niger Delta in any significant way. At the Political Reform Conference 2005, the delegates from the Niger Delta staged a walk-out over the issue of percentage allocated to derivation in the revenue allocation formula (Ado-Kurawa2005).

On assumption of office in 2007, President Musa Yar’Adua proclaimed security as one of his seven point agenda. He reorganised the NDDC, revised the Niger Delta Master Plan and created a Niger Delta Ministry. In June 2009, in a major
move to address the security situation, douse the persistent tension and deal with the violent protest in the Niger Delta, President Yar’Adua instituted an Amnesty Programme. The amnesty covered all militants who were willing to lay down their arms. It involved an elaborate process of disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration of the ex-militants into normal life. The amnesty window closed on October 24, 2009 after an extension.

According to Hon. Kingsley Kuku (Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta), 20,192 ex-agitators were demobilised and enrolled in a series of training programmes in the first phase at the Amnesty Office Camp in Obumbra, Cross River State. The second batch of 6,166 rounded off their non-violence transformational training by December 20, 2011. Following the completion of the non-violence training and career classification in the camp, the Amnesty Office placed a total of 7,556 ex-militants in skills acquisition/training centres and formal education centres both in the country and overseas, besides others in re-integration centres.

The beneficiaries of the Amnesty Programme were trained in 33 centres in the country. Some were sent to schools in South Africa, Malaysia, Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka, United States of America, India, Cyprus, Poland, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, the Philippines as well as Trinidad and Tobago. Others were sent to facilities in Greece, Belarus, Canada and Italy. Placement of the trainees in skills acquisition/vocational programmes was based on their expressed interest in areas such as pipeline welding, underwater welding, ocean diving, crane operations, aviation, boat building, oil drilling, automobile technology, fish farming and entrepreneurship, as well as formal education (Francis 2014, Premium Times 2012).

The Amnesty Programme is acclaimed to be very successful. Before the proclamation of amnesty for the Niger Delta ex-militants, oil production dropped to an all-time low of 700,000 barrels per day. With the Amnesty Programme, production
immediately rose to 2.4 million barrels per day, reaching 2.6 million barrels per day. This is an increase of 1.9 million barrels per day, with the production savings of crude oil for the country at $104 million per day. The savings for Nigeria for the year ending 2012 is estimated at a whooping N6.3 trillion (NSRP 2014).

Beautiful as the Amnesty Programme may seem, it has raised several issues concerning its implication for state-citizens relations. For instance, if the government takes responsibility for those who took up arms against it, should it ignore those who suffer the consequences of oil but have not taken up arms? Secondly, the robustness of the rehabilitation and training in a country of massive youth unemployment renders it a very attractive programme such that even non-violent youths are willing to declare themselves ex-militants in order to benefit from the programme. As the saying goes, all you need do to gain access to employment and scholarship for overseas training is to declare yourself an ex-militant in the Niger-Delta. Should the government therefore transform the programme into a permanent programme of empowerment for Niger Delta youths?

There are several other issues that arise for the government. These are to do with what happens after those trained abroad return to the country. Are they to be offered automatic employment or are they to be offered guaranteed pay until they secure employment independently? What is the responsibility of the various states and local governments, the Ministry of the Niger Delta, and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) for youth empowerment, education and employment in this regard? How effective have the NDDC and the Ministry of the Niger Delta been in providing the required social and physical infrastructures? What conciliatory programmes are in place to build peace within communities in that region?

From the preceding discussion, oil exploitation and the
distribution of oil revenue has become central to peace and stability in Nigeria. This applies to other natural resources where they constitute a significant source of revenue for government and are crucial to federalism and human security. Efforts to address the Niger Delta resource conflict have followed three non-violent approaches. The first set has been carried out as part of the accommodative process of the federal framework. These include the creation of states for minority oil-bearing communities and the adjustment of the revenue sharing formula, which the 1999 Constitution put at not less than 13 percent derivation.

The second set has been through intervention programmes that target physical infrastructure and social amenities in those communities as done by OMPADEC, NDDC and the Niger Delta Ministry, as well as through corporate philanthropy. The third is the Amnesty Programme. The Amnesty Programme gives the Federal Government of Nigeria an image of a detested strong external force having a rethink and reaching out to the states and their protesting militants for reconciliation and peace.

The federal structure defines the territories in a manner that makes the problem less an ethnic group issue but rather as a problem peculiar to an administrative territory which is inhabited by multiple ethnic groups and requiring an institutional response. That is why in spite of the violence in the Niger Delta, no claim of genocide was ever made. These conciliatory approaches have shown that the political institution of federalism provides both a framework and an opportunity for a variety of interventions to deal with the Niger Delta challenge. These are distinct from the traditional national security approach that contributed in no small measure to the escalation of violence in the region. If properly organised and sustained, these non-violent approaches, including the amnesty programme, remain promising in promoting individual freedom from fear and want, just as they allow for the right to pursue a life of dignity.
There are calls for the amnesty approach to the Boko Haram insurgency, but efforts to negotiate with the Boko Haram group have not succeeded. Some have also argued that the grievances of the Boko Haram are not similar to the case in the Niger Delta. All agree that intervention to reduce poverty, ignorance and disease and provide economic opportunities will go a long in reducing susceptibility to radicalisation and thereby recruitment into Boko Haram.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Generally, human security has come to emphasise freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. While efforts to promote human security may take various forms, federalism provides a framework for dealing with conflicts over natural resources as it provides a negotiated guide for extraction of natural resources and distribution of revenue from such resource extraction among the various segments that constitute the state. Since human security is directly linked with development, it is also tied to the way political structure relates to development performance and therefore to political institutions. Indeed, federalism provides an institutional framework for the achievement of human security, since, as the UNDP (1994) notes, human security is connected to the “quality of growth and the equity of its distribution.” Thus, efforts to improve human security must relate to the institutions that link citizens to the state.

In federal systems, fiscal federalism is central to an equitable and negotiated approach to natural resource management. It operates at the interface between individuals and the state, as well as how groups provide space for the individual to relate to the state at various governmental levels. Where states are not embedded in society, the state suffers from legitimacy deficit that may frustrate its drive for security. Where state-society relations are problematic, as in divided societies, federalism becomes an option central to both state security and human security. However, the effective utilisation of federalism, as I have argued elsewhere requires
the transformation of state-society relations by responsible political leadership (Aiyede 2013).

In the Nigerian case, we see how federal principles have been used to address natural resource conflicts and how they have been utilised to mitigate the effects of centrifugal forces and guarantee a space for individual and group freedoms with varying degrees of successes. Indeed, any human security intervention must take into account the institutional architecture of the state in order for it to promote institution building and sustainability. In the case of external intervention, state institutions and agencies must be recognised and utilised together with non-state, non-formal organisations in order to avoid the fostering of disengagement or reinforcement of a shadow state which may further undermine state legitimacy and deepen existing distrust between the state and citizens.

References


Macmillan. Pp. 131-146.


