CONTEMPORARY MUSLIMS' BELIEFS AND PRACTICES: BETWEEN ORTHODOXY AND SYNCRETISM

(Essays in honor of Professor Murtada Aremu Mukibbu-Din)

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History and Faces of Orthodox Islam and Muslims in Nigeria

Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman

Abstract
This paper provides a historical framework of reconstructing the orthodox faces of Islam in Nigeria from the time of its foothold in Kanem and Bornu kingdoms to the present modern Nigeria and contends that some basic homogeneous beliefs and features serve as a definition of orthodox Islam in Nigeria. The paper argues further that the commonality of these beliefs and practice of Islam far outweigh the “differences and dichotomies” in the abuses and corruption of Islam. In reclaiming the true orthodox identities of Muslims in Nigeria, the paper eschews both the 'Outside-In' and 'Inside-Out' schemas that construct Islam and Muslims using a unipolar approach by either outsiders-non-Muslims or insiders-Muslims.

Introduction
While the Nigerian constitution recognizes the multi-cultural and religious composition of the country, which ordinarily should engender peaceful co-existence, the country has almost been torn apart by ethno-cultural and religious conflicts. Consequently, some analysts have propounded the theory that political Islam, which characterizes the revolutionary nature of the Hausa Muslims as opposed to the quietist nature of the Yoruba Muslims, is responsible for the violent religious eruptions in Nigeria. The thesis that there are two typologies of Islam in Nigeria, one that is tolerant and one that is belligerent may be analogous to Ali Mazrui's "indigenous and immigrant Islam" in the USA or Ernest Gellner's "High Islam and Low/Folk Islam." It is however not true in the case of Nigerian Muslims as I have shown elsewhere. Neither is it true that there cannot be a universal definition of
orthodox Islam both because the "constituent elements and relationships" of a religion "are historically specific" and "that definition of religion is itself the historical product of discursive process.

I will therefore proceed to employ a bipolar approach through the lens of both insiders and outsiders that maintain both the internal coherence of orthodox Islamic beliefs and Muslim practices as well as the images of syncretism projected by some abuses and corruption of these beliefs and practices. I will through this bipolar approach represent what some orthodox Islamic beliefs and practices mean to both insiders and outsiders and through this avoid the polarization between two opposites, the Muslim world and the West so as not to retreat into the conviction that outsiders know more than others about themselves and are therefore able to stand back and judge or that Muslim insiders alone can explore the faces of Islam in Nigeria. To do this, this paper will begin with a brief history of Islam in Nigeria and the orthodox Islamic beliefs and Muslim practices. This will be followed by an analysis of the images of orthodoxy in Nigerian Muslim beliefs and practices. I will then show how comprehensive secularism undermines the quest to maintain and sustain the unity of orthodox Muslims in Nigeria.

Islam in Nigeria
The history of Islam is very long and rich in the areas now known as Nigeria. In fact, Wright put the advent of Islam in Nigeria as far back as the Seventh century. This is particularly true of the advent of Islam in the Kanuri Kingdoms of Kanem and Bornu. It is reported that Muhammad Mani introduced Islam into Kanem during the reign of Mai Bulu. Muhammad Mani and other traders from Fezzan introduced Islam into the Empire through the trade routes between Tripoli and the Lake Chad Basin. However, Islam came to many other areas of what is known as Nigeria today through scholars from the old Mali Empire. At the time of the decline of the Mali Empire, it was in Nigeria especially the Northern part, such as Kano, Katsina and Zaria, that many of its
scholars went to settle. Even the Yoruba in South-western Nigeria still refer to Islam as "esin Imale" meaning the religion of Mali. It is also supported by the "Kano Chronicle" that documents the presence of Muslims in Kano by the middle of the 14th century. The growth of Islam in the mid-western region during the colonial area was largely the result of the efforts of migrant Muslim traders from northern and western Nigeria. In 1890, it was reported that the establishment of a military base in Calabar, an important Efik town facilitated the arrival of Muslim traders and the building of a mosque. The natives were reportedly impressed by the dress and devotions of these Muslims that Goldie of the Primitive Methodist Society in Calabar, concluded that in time, the natives could begin to imitate them. From 1896 there were also reports of Muslim elephant hunters from Kano in Elele, Port Harcourt.

In 1903, Muslims in eastern Nigeria were also reported to have been mainly traders, some of whom did settle there before indigenous leaders such as Alhaji Sufiyan Agwasim, a Roman catholic converted to Islam. Yet, despite the presence of migrant Hausa Muslims in Igbo land, from that time, Islam was mostly seen as the religion of the Hausas, a belief that was deepened by the Nigerian civil war. By 1984, therefore, Abdurrahman Doi, the Bangladesh Islamic scholar who was based in Nigeria at the time collected the statistics of Igbo Muslims and put their figures at 3,450 persons. In addition, in 1991 the figures were estimated at 10,000 persons. Using a conversion rate of 1 Muslim for every 1000 Christians, the figures can today be put at 16,000 from an Igbo population of over sixteen Million.

That Islam was therefore very strong in Northern Nigeria and Southwestern Nigeria before the advent of Christianity in Nigeria created a great misunderstanding when Christian missionaries started using Western education to Christianize non-Christians or as an instrument of conversion. The conversion of Muslims to Christianity through the Schools led to the first religious conflict and indeed retarded Muslim education in Nigeria. However as shown by Akintola, the colonialists lay the blame for this retarded
Muslim education “squarely on the Muslim doorsteps as reflected in Henry Carr’s” depiction of Muslims as clogs in the progress of colonial administration.

This depiction of the Muslims by the Colonial masters was nonetheless rejected by the Muslims as reflected in Fafunwa’s analysis that Muslim education was retarded because missionary cum colonial education was irretrievably tied to Christianization. This view is also supported by a Christian, Ayandele, who explained how the British government used education to win converts the Christian Church in Southern Nigeria in particular, which made the Muslim North to revolt against it. As a result of this revolt, Muslim education along Western lines was retarded in the North. For instance, according to Peter B. Clarke because the Emirs opposed the introduction of English as the medium of instruction in schools, “one of the consequences was that in places like Bauchi Emirate there were, by 1952 only 18,000 people literate in English out of a population of over one million, and in Kano the figure was 23,000 out of a population of almost three and half million.”

The above rejection of colonial education by Muslims is not restricted to Nigeria as Muslims all over Africa tend to boycott colonial schools because of discrimination against them and the attendant conversion to Christianity. This was the case in Kenya where Muslim education was retarded for many years because of the fear of conversion. This is also similar to the experience of Muslims in Ethiopia where as depicted by Ubah, Muslims who had had a long and turbulent history in the country were converted alongside other indigenous populations to Christianity in missionary schools with probably the support of the colonial administration.

Furthermore, the manner the colonial masters in Nigeria undermined the operation of the Sharifah or the Islamic law also contributed in no small measure to the rise of religious conflicts in Nigeria. Though Lord Lugard, the then Governor-General
promised not to undermine the practice of the Shari'ah or intrude into the lives of Muslims in Nigeria, the British government led by him later abolished penalties they considered repugnant to natural justice such as amputation, death penalty, non-inheritance of an heir that differs from the religion of the deceased etc. In 1943, for example, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of an alkali court that Mary, a Christian could not inherit from her Muslim father. Again in 1948, the West African court of appeal set a death sentence passed on a murderer aside because it was contrary to the British Common Law (Karibi-Whyte, 1993).

This led to many violent demonstrations by Muslims in Northern Nigeria in the colonial era and since that time; there has been a train of killing, burning and destruction of lives, properties, Mosques, Churches and houses particularly in the middle Belt region. Since then Christians have perceived the implementation of the Shari'ah in Nigeria as symbol of Muslim domination. For instance, the demand by Muslims during the 1975 Constitution Drafting Committee work for a federal Shari'ah court to sit over appeals from state Shari'ah courts was totally rejected by the Christian members of the 1977-78 constituent Assembly. Its deliberation resulted in a total stalemate with Muslims from the North walking out of the conference until the Yoruba Muslims served as mediators that diffused the tension. Led by Chief M. K. O. Abiola, the Yoruba Muslims became the vanguards of a compromise acceptable to both Muslims and Christians over the Shari'ah stalemate. That compromise is the provision of a special committee of the Supreme Court in place of a federal Shari'ah court to sit over appeals from state Shari'ah courts (Laitin, 1986:418).

However, during the above stalemate, a major bone of contention between Muslims and Christians borders on whether Nigeria is a secular state or not. According to Clarke, above this debate has been a live issue between Muslims and Christians since the colonial period. The debate came to a head during the above Constitution Drafting Committee work when it was suggested that
the country be described as "one and indivisible sovereign Republic, secular, democratic and social," and divided Christians and Muslims into two opposing camps, those who supported the inclusion of the term "secular" to imply state neutrality in matters of religion and those opposed to the inclusion because in certain circumstances, a ruler hostile to religion makes use of the term to impose restrictions on the practice of religion. Clarke concludes that it is difficult to know the extent to which the Muslim opposition to secularism can be said to be part of contemporary resurgence of Islam that is in form of the type of return to Islamic state championed by Ibn Fudi or a challenge to the global concept of modernity that is based on Western industrial "Christian" Civilization.

I will attempt to answer Clarke shortly on whether the Muslim opposition to secularism can be said to be part of contemporary resurgence of Islam that is in form of the type of return to Islamic state championed by Ibn Fudi or a challenge to the global concept of modernity that is based on Western industrial "Christian" Civilization. But first, I want to explore the orthodox faces of Islam and Muslims and their common orthodox despite the notion that it is 'problematic' to define Islam and "identify, with some degree of validity, “the faces of Islam” in Nigeria.

Orthodox Faces of Islam and Muslims

This paper contends that Muslims in Nigeria share some basic homogeneous orthodox beliefs and features that can serve as a definition of Islam and its faces in Nigeria. The commonality of beliefs and practice of Islam shared by Muslims of Nigeria, far outweigh the "differences and dichotomies" that seek to divide them into 'Northern and southern Islam' or 'Hausa and Yoruba Muslims' as well as divide Muslims into Sunni and Shiites, Sufis and Ahmadis etc.

The orthodox faces of Islam in Nigeria may be located in the unique and distinct Islamic intellectual, socio-cultural, spiritual, diplomatic and commercial legacies. Despite the prevalence of
different forms of syncretism among Muslims in Nigeria, they are united by some intellectual, socio-cultural, spiritual, diplomatic and commercial identities and images that reflect their common understanding of the teachings and tenets of Islam as contained in the Islamic texts. Therefore just as the five pillars of Islam in these texts can be depicted in the unitary, to a very large extent, so also the above five components of the faces of Muslims in Nigeria can be constructed in the singular.

Perhaps the first face that gives Islam and Muslims their orthodox identity in Nigeria is the intellectual capacity of the religion. As noted by Abdul, Islam and Muslims provided intellectual capacity for Nigerians through its Qur'an literacy and its other literary activities. The literacy which Islam gave illiterate Nigerians became an enduring means to preserve indigenous history of the country. Muslims became known for their intellectual outputs as people came to the Muslim schools and train as administrators, interpreters, diplomats and other workers for easy royal bureaucracy. Nigerian Islamic schools produced scholars in all disciplines in the mould of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) whom Philip Hitti praises as a "philosopher who was born at the wrong time and the wrong place".

The above intellectual capacity of Islam and Muslims was demonstrated in Hausa land, where according to Clarke the foundations of a viable system of education had been laid before the coming of the British colonialists. According to Clarke, "In the pre-colonial era an educated Muslim had a good chance of being employed in government service or of gaining a livelihood from teaching, as in the colonial period an education in a Christian mission or western-style school often led to a career in government service or teaching." There were schools and colleges which were established by different Muslim communities. However, in addition, students would also go and seek tuition from prominent individuals and families by embarking on "a journey of hundreds of kilometers and years away from home." This is true of Muslims in the North and southwest of Nigeria just as it is true of Muslims all over Africa.
Islamic socio-cultural practices also gave Muslims a unique identity which attracted many traditional worshippers to Islam. Islamic practices of allocation of inheritance shares to women, religious attires as reflected in women's *hijāb* or head veil and men's turbans, extended family structures that accommodated marrying up to four wives are among the socio-cultural practices that combined together to give Muslims in Nigeria their orthodox differences from non-Muslims. Most women wear the head veil known as *Iborun* and which has become cultural among the Yoruba and is worn as part of the social expression by both Muslim and non-Muslim women. This Yoruba *Iborun* is even worn by women from other parts of the country, especially the North.

The *Niqāb* or face veil which hitherto used to be common among a few Muslim organizations in Yoruba land such as the *Bamidele* and the *Sanglitti* that are regarded to have emerged as stout defenders of the Islamic identity by refusing to wear anything but Islamic dress and speaking only Arabic and the local language has today become widely accepted among the female youths, especially members of the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN), including even those in the higher institutions of learning. According to Clarke, the *Bamidele* movement in Yoruba land imposed *purdah* and seclusion on women, and men were obliged to wear the turban and gown, and shave their heads and grow beards. The *Niqāb* which used to be common among Muslims in the North where *purdah* and seclusion of women have been central issues and where there was strong protest against girls attending schools beyond the age of puberty is now also emphasized in the South as Muslim women, embrace the education of the child girl and together with the use of the *Niqāb*.

However, the bane of modern Nigeria and by extension many modern secular nations is the manner these Muslim ladies are today constantly harassed for wearing the Islamic head veils and are forced to make choices between keeping their head veils and going to schools or working. There have been documented cases of Muslim girls that were flogged for daring to wear their veils to schools in Lagos Southwest Nigeria. This is happening though
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that "every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion... and in public or in private to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance." The provision is clear that Nigerians are allowed to practice, manifest and propagate their religion. It is therefore my contention that it is the secular current that prevents Muslims from the practice, manifestation and propagation of the teachings of their religion that is despoiling the faces of Islam in Nigeria and not the above Clarke's Muslim opposition to the global concept of modernity that is based on Western industrial "Christian" Civilization. It is the secular current that is playing Muslims against Muslims and Christians against Muslims and providing the opportunities for the creation of both political Christianity and political Islam and shattering the stability of not only peaceful co-existence among all the co-religionists in the country but also the stability of the country and universe.

The spiritual and mystical orders of the Sufis also gave Islam in Nigeria its orthodox accommodating face that became attractive to the teeming Nigerians. The impact of Sufis on the face of Islam in Nigeria is immeasurable. Contrary to the laxity and syncretism observed today among members of these orders, it was the efforts of Sufis teachers and masters such as Shaykh Ibn Fudi that assisted in the reformation of Islam in Northern Nigeria and gave Islam in that area an authentic Islamic identity. From documents such as the "Kano Chronicle", Peter B. Clarke like other scholars surmises that Muslim rulers of Kano in the 17th century mixed Islam with indigenous traditional practices such as the use of talisman and collection of Un-Islamic taxes. This coupled with the activities of 'venal scholars' laid the foundations for the reformation of Hausa-land. Scholars of the Old Sokoto Caliphate provided religious leadership for the populace during their revivalist activities in Hausa-land not as spokesmen of God but as universal scholars who were knowledgeable in Islam and the world and who gave legal verdicts that were in tandem with the accommodating spirit of Islam. For instance, contrary to the claim of those who attribute the Sokoto military attack against the
Islamic state of Bornu to political, ethnic and other negative reasons, the leadership of the Sokoto Jihad did not justify the attack on Bornu on the grounds that the leaders condoned un-Islamic practices. They argued instead that the reason why they approved of the attack "was because the Mai of Bornu had given assistance to the non-Muslim Hausa forces who opposed the reform movement."

In short, the leaders of the reform movement "were not out and out visionaries" who sought to transform Hausa land overnight. They were not extremists nor intolerant but were prepared to win the people to their "point of view through preaching, teaching and discussion rather than by force." They were not bent on outlawing Muslims because their "beliefs and practices" were "in certain respects reprehensible." Unlike some Muslim preachers, they were also not inquisitors "who continually questioned people about their Islamic beliefs and on receiving unsatisfactory answers categorized them as unbelievers and targets for Jihad." In doing so, they did achieve a good deal of success in the educational sphere. The reform movement spread literacy in Arabic, Hausa and Fulani over a much wider area, "making it possible for far greater number of people to become acquainted with the actual text of the Qur'an, Islamic history and the Islamic sciences in general." It also gave rise to a greater interest in and concern for the education of women, to the establishment of more Muslim schools and training of ever-increasing numbers of Muslim teachers who enjoyed considerable moral and religious authority in the towns and villages transforming the attitudes and in general the style of living of the people.

Following the above interest in and concern for education of women, increasingly from the 1940s, many Muslims in northern Nigeria began to emphasize that Islamic education "should not only be preserved but also developed and expanded" to provide for both men and women "the skills and qualifications gained in the Western education system." In line with the teachings of Ibn Fudi who in his book Nur al-Albab strongly condemned most of the scholars for leaving their wives and daughters uneducated, the Emir of Katsina opened a school for Muslim women. Ibn Fudi
was of the opinion that it is as binding upon women to learn commercial subjects as it is to learn religious subjects. Consequently, other Muslim leaders such as Isa Wali were also encouraged to raise their voices against the seclusion, oppression and restriction of women from western educational pursuits and the attendant outdoor activism in civil service, teaching, industry and other sectors as public servants, lawyers and managers etc. Similarly, "Islam" as noted by Clarke "did not set out to force non-Muslims to become Muslims at the point of the sword, nor did it enslave or despise all non-Muslims in northern Nigeria." So, despite the Sokoto reform movement, non-Muslims who were found on the boundaries between the major emirates were referred to by the Muslims as Maguzawa or people with whom it was justifiable for Muslims to live in peace. Quoting Murray last, Clarke explained that the Maguzawa "were not really the targets for jihad... the jihad of 1804 was primarily a reform movement, reforming lax Muslims, not converting pagans. It was ideologically probably less concerned with the Kufr (unbelief) of pagans than with of the Kufr those Muslims who opposed the jihad."

Another orthodox face of Islam in Nigeria is the construction of diplomatic and international relations between Muslims of Nigeria and the outside world. That Islam brought Nigeria to borrow from Chamberlain "into the great diplomatic and trading world" is confirmed by trading towns like Sokoto, Kano, Kanem and Katsina as well as Nigerian hajj traffic even when pilgrims had to treck for years before reaching the holy lands in Makkah and Madinah. The traffic from Nigeria to the holy lands assisted in cementing diplomatic and trading relations between Muslims in Nigeria and Muslim in various parts of the Muslim world such as staying at Mai Wurno in the Sudan, working on the cotton plantations at Gezira and attending lectures at al-Azhar. Though very few southern Nigerians appeared to have made pilgrimage before 1918, there was a gradual increase in the pilgrim traffic and by the 1920s; pilgrims were leaving from Ijebu-Ode, Ibadan, Iwo, Ondo, Oyo, Ogbomoso and other towns in Southern Nigeria. These pilgrims became exposed to considerable pan-Islamism
and anti-Western propaganda.

For a long time, trading, which heralded Islam into Nigeria and indeed the entire West Africa has become part of the hajji exercise has remained a major feature and tradition of Muslims. The spread of Islam in Nigeria like West Africa to borrow from Trimingham could almost be entirely attributed to the efforts of merchants and traders. With the advent of colonial administration, Muslims in the North "took advantage of the construction of roads and railways and the establishment of new towns such as Jos, in Plateau State, to expand their commercial and "religious" interests. They travelled into these new non-Muslim towns and to commercial centres in the south and east of Nigeria such as Ijebu-Ode, Ibadan, Lagos, Onitsha, Benin and Port Harcourt and displayed their talents for trade and commerce. With their commerce wealth, important arts and crafts and their skills in market organizations, language and values; they soon used the influence to spread Islam among non-Muslims in northern Nigeria. In the 1950s many of the Muslims in the "Middle Belt" zone of Nigeria were traders from cities such as Kano and Jos. In fact, during the first decade of the 20th century, the Catholic missionaries in eastern Nigeria were reportedly alarmed by the number of Muslim traders moving from the north to the south.

Similarly, the growth of Islam in southern Nigeria during the colonial era was peaceful. Though in 1926 Muslims were reported to have constituted 5 percent of the total population of the Southern provinces and the Christians 9 percent but by 1963, Muslims had made up 43.4 percent of the population in western Nigeria and 44.3 of the population in Lagos. According to Clarke, one of the most important reasons responsible for this was the way Muslims in the southwest developed their own methods of dealing with western style education through the establishment of Muslim organizations such as the Egbe Killa in Lagos that provided a western education with a firm grounding in Islamic sciences. So also the growth of Islam in the mid-western region during the colonial area was largely the result of the efforts of Muslim traders from northern and western Nigeria. From 1903, Muslims in
eastern Nigeria were also reported to have been mainly traders, some of whom did settle there before indigenous leaders such as Alhaji Sufiyan Agwasim, a Roman catholic converted to Islam.

Conclusion

The advent and spread of Islam in Nigeria were largely peaceful through migrant Muslim scholars until the coming of Christianity backed by colonialism, which is the root of the perennial religious conflicts in the country. These conflicts are rooted in the colonial administration support for the missionaries' use of education for evangelism. The unwillingness of Muslims to be Christianized accounts for the long history of Muslim retarded education in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa. Subsequently, Muslims constitute majority of the illiterate in western style education, the poor and the unemployed. These are the major factors fuelling the discontents of Muslims in Nigeria coupled with the denial of Muslims their constitutional rights to practice the tenets of Islam. However all these challenges have not undermined the orthodox faces of Islam and Muslims identified in this paper.

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